University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 24
Number 1 Summer, 1993

Article 13

1993

Recent Developments: Tyler v. State: Prosecutors
Barred from Using Peremptory Challenges to
Exclude Jurors on the Basis of Gender
Kelly A. Casper

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Casper, Kelly A. (1993) "Recent Developments: Tyler v. State: Prosecutors Barred from Using Peremptory Challenges to Exclude
Jurors on the Basis of Gender," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 24 : No. 1 , Article 13.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol24/iss1/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Tyler v. State

PROSECUTORS BARRED
FROM USING PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES TO EXCLUDE
JURORS ON THE BASIS OF
GENDER.

In Tyler v. State, 330 Md. 261,
623 A.2d 648 (1993), the Court of
Appeals ofMaryland precluded prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis
of gender. Through its ruling, the
court extended the United States Supreme Court's holding in Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which
prohibited the peremptory striking of
jurors based on race. Peremptory
challenges are now permitted in a
more limited capacity in Maryland
than in federal courts.
Jerry Samuel Tyler and Gerald
Wynn Eiland were jointly charged
and tried for murder in the Circuit
Court for Prince George's County.
At trial, defense counsel challenged
the prosecution's use of peremptory
strikes under Batson v. Kentucky.
Counsel alleged that the prosecutor
used these strikes to exclude jurors on
the basis of race and gender. The
prosecutor denied strikingjurors based
upon their race but conceded that it
had struck women because ofa belief
that women could not act as impartial
jurors. Thereupon, the Circuit Court
for Prince George's County performed
the Batson analysis only as to race,
refusing to extend the protection to
gender.
Despite the adverse ruling, defense counsel proffered a gender-based
argument for the record. That position was based on the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Articles 24 and 46 of the
Maryland Declaration ofRights. The
Circuit Court denied the defendant's
Batson challenge as to race, and Tyler
and Eiland were convicted of murder.
Both defendants appealed to the
court of special appeals where the
cases were consolidated for purposes
of the opinion. Absent such a ruling
by the Supreme Court, the court of
special appeals refused to extend
Batson to gender-based strikes. Furthermore, the court found no support
for the gender-based interpretation in
either Article 24 or Article 46 of the
Maryland Declaration ofRights. The
Court of Appeals of Maryland certified the case on the question ofwhether
Maryland law prohibits the exercise
of peremptory challenges to strike

jurors on the basis of gender. The
court began its analysis with a discussion of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986), and its progeny. In Batson,
the Supreme Court ofthe United States
ruled that Equal Protection forbids
prosecutors, during jury selection,
from using peremptory strikes to exclude jurors solely on the basis oftheir
race.ld. at263, 623 A.2dat649. The
court then looked at Hernandez v.
New York, 500 U.S. _, 111 S. Ct.
1859 (1991), which announced a
three-step process to evaluate Batson
claims. This process requires the
defendant to initially raise the issue
and make aprimaJacie showing that
the prosecutor challenged a juror solely
because of race. Once this showing is
made, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide a race-neutral reason for striking the juror. Finally, the
court must determine if the
prosecutor's motive for dismissing
the juror was racially discriminatory.
Tyler, 330 Md. at 263-64, 623 A.2d
at 650.
Having set forth the applicable
precedent, the court asserted that their
applicability to peremptory challenges
based on gender had not yet been
determined. ld. at 264,623 A.2d at
650. Citing Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the court
found that Maryland law prohibits
both racial and gender discrimination. The court further asserted that
although the Maryland Declaration
of Rights contains no express guarantee of equal protection, it ls incorporated by the due process requirement
of Article 24. ld. at 266,623 A.2d at
650, citing Attorney General v.
Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d
929 (1981). Furthermore, Article 46
ofthe Maryland Declaration ofRights ,
also called the Equal Rights Amendment, requires equality of rights for
all Maryland citizens, regardless of
gender. Thus, under Maryland law,
gender-based discrimination in any
form is "suspect." Tyler, 330 Md. at
266, 623 A.2d at 651-52.
Next, the court applied its analysis of the state and federal law under
Batson, to the problem of gender discrimination. The court ruled that
because Batson's holding was based

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
on the theory that race is a "suspect
classification," such strikes are subject to "strict scrutiny." Id Therefore, since gender is a "suspect classification" under Maryland law, the
court permitted Batson's requirement
of strict scrutiny to be extended to
strikes based upon gender. Id
Finally, in applying its analysis to
the case at bar, the court concluded
that the trial court had erred by denying defense counsel the opportunity to
litigate the use of peremptory strikes
on the basis of gender. Id at 270, 623
A.2d at 653. The court also ruled that

Darby v. Cisneros

COURTS ARE NOT FREE TO
REQUIRE EXHA USTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
BEFORE SEEKING JUDICIAL
REVIEW IF IT IS NOT MANDATED BY EITHER THE
ENABLING STATUTE OR
AGENCY RULES.

the prosecutor should not be permitted to attempt to propound a genderneutral explanation in any later proceeding. This peremption is based on
the fact that the prosecution freely
admitted, in the first trial, to exercising peremptory challenges to exclude
women from the jury. Id at 271,623
A.2d at 653. The court remanded to
the case to the circuit court for a new
trial.
In Tyler v. State, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland expanded the
Supreme Court's ruling in Batson v.
Kentucky. The court re-examined the

Batson framework and found that
under Articles 24 and 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the prosecution cannot peremptorily challenge
jurors on the basis of gender. Although the decision strips the prosecution of broad discretion in jury
selection, it heightens the State's accountability to the defendant. Moreover, it encourages both women and
men to serve on juries by discouraging the use of traditional stereotypes
about female and male jurors.

The Supreme Court of the United
States resolved a conflict between the
judicially created doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
the statutory requirements of section
lO(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") in Darby v.
Cisneros, _ U.S. _, 113 S.Ct. 2539
(1993). The Court held that when the
AP A applies, courts are not free to
require exhaustion as a rule ofjudicial
administration where the agency action has already become final under
section I o( c).
Petitioner, R. Gordon Darby
("Darby") was a South Carolina real
estate developer who developed and
managed multi-family rental projects.
Darby worked with a mortgage
banker, Lonnie Garvin, who developed a plan to permit multi-family
developers to obtain single-family
mortgage insurance from the respondent, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development ("HUD").
Garvin's plan allowed Darby to avoid
HUD's "Rule of Seven" which prevented rental properties from receiving single family mortgage insurance
if the mortgagor already had financial
interests in seven or more similar rental
properties in the same project or subdivision.
Darby obtained the financing for
three separate multi-unit projects and
although he successfully rented the
units, a combination of factors forced
him to default. As a result, HUD

acquired responsibility for the payment of over $6.6 million in insurance
claims.
In June of 1989, HUD issued a
limited denial of participation prohibiting petitioners from taking part in
any program in South Carolina administered by respondent, Assistant
Secretary of Housing, for one year.
During a hearing on the consolidated
appeals, an Administrative Law Judge
issued an "Initial Decision and Order" and found good cause to debar
petitioners for a period of eighteen
months.
Neither petitioner nor respondent
sought further administrative review
although they were entitled to request
a review by the Secretary according
to 24 C.F.R. § 24.314(c) (1992).
Instead, petitioners filed suit in the
United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina seeking an
injunction or declaration that the administrative sanctions were imposed
for purposes of punishment in violation ofHUD's own debarment regulations. The respondents moved to
dismiss the complaint on the grounds
that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The district
court denied respondents' motion to
dismiss reasoning that the administrative remedy was inadequate. In a
su bsequent opinion, the court granted
petitioners' motion for summary
judgement.
On appeal by the respondents,
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